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In data sonification research, there is a well-known perceptual
problem that arises when abstract multivariate datasets of a
certain size and complexity are parametrically mapped into
sound. In listening to such sonifications, when a feature
appears, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether that
feature is actually a feature of the dataset or just a resultant of
the psychoacoustic interaction between co-dependent
parametric dimensions. A similar effect occurs in visualisation,
such as when parallel lines can appear more or less curved on
different backgrounds. Couched in psycho-philosophical terms,
we can ask whether this failure is related to classical
phenomenology's inability to produce an eidetic science of
essential invariant forms that involve no assertion of actual
material existence, or to there not yet having been found some
generalisably acceptable limits from heuristically tested
mappings. This paper discusses the nature of this problem and
introduces a sonification research project based on embodied,
non-representational phenomenal models of perception.
1. PARAMETRIC MAPPING SONIFICATION (PMS)
The use of discrete sounds for auditory alerts and alarms
presents sound designers primarily with differentiation
problems: both between the sounds themselves and between the
sounds and the background environment in which they
function. Though related in subtle ways, these discrete auditory
displays do not address another problem: how to acoustically
represent data relations for interpretation by listeners, for the
purpose of increasing their knowledge of the source from which
the data was acquired. That task can be recast as one of how to
use sound to create mental ‘objects’ for active contemplation, as
distinct from how to correctly elicit a timely response to already
well-differentiated auditory stimuli. 
The term 'data sonification' is usually reserved for a
collection of techniques for exploring datasets that have an
equally–spaced metric in at least one dimension and in which
there are sufficient data points to afford continuous aural
interpolation between them[1]. Such dataset representations are
most commonly used to learn more about the systems that
produced them. Applications range from monitoring the real-
time operation of machines, capital–market trading, geographic
and demographic features, weather and the environment and so
on; as tools to assist in the discovery of features and new
regularities, and to assisting those with visual impairment to
gain access to large quantities of information normally
presented graphically.
Parameter mapping is the most widely used sonification
technique for representing multi-dimensional data as sound.
Parameter mapping sonifications (PMSs) are sometimes
referred to as sonic scatter plots [2][3] or nth–order parameter
mappings [4]. Typically, data dimensions are mapped to sound
parameters: either to physical (frequency, amplitude),
psychophysical (pitch, loudness) or perceptually coherent
complexes (timbre, rhythm). PMSs can have both analogical
and symbolic components. Analogic variations in the sound can
result when mapping from a large data domain into a small
perceptual range or when data is specifically mapped to
acoustic modifiers such as frequency or amplitude modulators.
PMS is sometimes referred to as multivariate data mapping, in
which multiple variables are mapped to a single sound. Scaletti
describes one way of implementing it by “mapping of each
component of a multidimensional data point to a coefficient of a
polynomial and then using that polynomial as the transfer
function for a sinusoidal input” [4]. Within an overall analogic
mapping, symbolic representations such as auditory beacons [5]
can be used to highlight features such as new maxima and
minima, or absolute reference points in a sonification such as
ticks to indicate the regular passing of time. 
2. FOR SONICULATION OR MUSICAL EXPRESSION?
It is useful to distinguish data sonifications made for the
purposes of facilitating communication or interpretation of
relational information in the data, and data-driven music
composition, ambient soundscapes and the like—the primary
purpose of which is the expression of musical knowledge and
broader cultural considerations, whatever they may be. The
current use of the term “sonification” to include such cultural
concerns is unfortunate because it blurs purposeful distinctions,
yet today, the the older expression “scientific sonification”
seems unnecessarily restricted. So, for situations in which the
distinction is considered important, the portmanteau term
soniculation (from sonic + articulation) has been introduced to
mean the representation of data with sound with the principal
and overriding imperative of making the structural
characteristics of the data as clear and explicit to a listener as
possible—even at the expense of other aesthetic considerations,
if necessary[1].
Needing to maintain this distinction is not to suggest that
there are not commonalities. In fact, as discussed later in this
paper, the two activities can provide insights that are mutually
useful. What is important is to maintain a critical awareness
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that, because the purposes of the activities are different, so will
their epistemological imperatives and consequences, such as,
for example, in tool design and useability.
3. “THE MAPPING PROBLEM”
A contemporary overview of the current range of sonification
and other auditory display techniques is available[1]. The
technique discussed here, parametric mapping sonification
(PMS) has a number of positive aspects, which Scaletti first
outlined in some detail [4]. Many data dimensions can be
listened to simultaneously. It is very flexible and the mappings
can be easily changed, allowing different aural perspectives of
the same data. In addition, acoustic production can be assigned
to sophisticated tools originally developed for computer music
synthesis. These are readily available and permit many quite
sophisticated parameter mappings to be synthesised in real-
time.
Frysinger provides a useful overview of the history of the
technique[6], and Flowers highlights some of its pitfalls and
possible future directions. An experienced multivariate data
sonifier, he observed that while “the claim that submitting the
entire contents of ‘dense and complex’ datasets to sonification
will lead to the ‘emergence’ of critical relationships continues
to be made, I have yet to see it ‘work’” [3]. The main limitation
of PMS is co-dependence, or lack orthogonality (linear
independence) in the psychophysical parameter space. Linear
changes in one domain produce non-linear auditory effects, and
the range and variation of such effects can differ considerably
with different parameters and synthesis techniques. These
perceptual parameter interactions can produce auditory artifacts
that obscure data relations and confuse the listener. Kramer
suggests that, although a truly balanced multivariate auditory
display may not be possible in practice, given powerful enough
tools, it may be possible to heuristically test mappings to within
acceptable limits for any given application [5]. 
In many discussions of data sonification, the distinction
between data and information is often lost. In fact, the
expression data sonification itself promotes an elision and in
doing so, implicitly supports the idea that information can
automatically “pop-out” of a sonification once an optimal
parameter-mapping of the dataset is found. The purpose of this
paper is to argue why this is unlikely (except perhaps for those
who have had advanced aural training acquired over many
years), and to argue that it is necessary to search for general
solutions outside of explicitly representational paradigms.
4. THE AUDITORY OBJECT
The historical record of the study of perception clearly reveals
the overwhelming dominance of arguments based on the visual
appearance of spatial objects; sounds not being considered as
objects in themselves but as secondary properties of spatial
objects and not essential to their ontology [7]. 
In tracing the roots of this “visualism” in pre-Socratic
Greek thought, Ihde concludes, citing Aristotle, that it is as old
as our own cultural heritage: “Above all we value sight …
because sight is the principle source of knowledge and reveals
many differences between one object and another.”[8]. So the
dawn of modern science was essentially a silent one and yet-to-
be-captured sound still quite mysterious. One of Descarte's
undervalued attributes was his honesty [9]:
As to other things such as light, colours,
sounds, scents, tastes, heat, cold and the
other tactile qualities, they are thought by
me with so much obscurity and confusion
that I do not even know if they are true or
false, i.e. whether the ideas which I form of
these qualities are actually the ideas of real
objects or not [or whether they only
represent chimeras which cannot exist in
fact].
The idea that an aural event could be objectified and studied in
its own right, that is independent of the means of its production,
evolved slowly and in parallel with the development of the
concept of a musical work as reproducible from notation [10]
and eventually with the use of various sound recording devices
invented during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
A distinction between the physical sounds (noumena) and
aural events (phenomena) is not just a philosophical one. It is
important that these two types of objects are not conflated as
there is an enticement to do when the (software) tools designed
to produce soundwaves are also used to produce abstract aural
phenomena, that is, immanent objects. One difficulty that arises
when tools from one task domain are appropriated to another is
the implicit transfer of the epistemological assumptions of the
former to the latter; an idea expressed in the saying “to a person
with a hammer, everything looks like a nail”. In the current
context, this translates to the assumption that tools used to
produce sounds for computer music are appropriate, or at least
adequate, for producing data sonifications. In fact, the particular
situation is even more convoluted as the tools designed to make
computer music have themselves embedded an epistemology of
music which privileges the production of the sounds of music
over its other aspects, such as gesture and temporal evolution.
This “timbre object fetish” in computer music can be
understood as having an historical basis in the early relationship
between computer music and artificial intelligence research,
both of which have continued the doctrine of isolating res
cogitans from res extensa and prejudiced the former over the
latter (cogito ergo sum – “I think therefore I am”).
5. UNDERSTANDING THE AURAL PHENOMENA
As perceptual phenomena, it is appropriate to make a
distinction between those sonifications that result from the
excitation of physical objects (or synthetic simulations that
closely approximate them, such as homomorphic modulation
and those based on physical modeling principles), and those,
such as a parametrically mapped datasets, that are artifacts of
perceptual processes in which elementally composed
soundpoints are assembled in such as way that the
psychophysical continuity of at least some of the parametric
dimensions conflates the perception of those soundpoints into a
single immanent object or perceptually coherent auditory scene.
The reason such a distinction is important is that physical
objects obey physical laws that human beings have evolved to
recognize the effect of with negligible attentional effort,
whereas sound structures synthesised from numerical datasets
may not. In the physical-modeling case, data is used to excite a
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“self-contained” resonator (an integrated unity obeying physical
laws)[1], or perhaps less convincingly, the data itself is used to
construct a physical model that is “resonated” by a listener
interacting with it [11][1]. In the case of objects synthesised
from numerical datasets, the elementally composed soundpoints
are 'presented' to listeners in ways that it is hoped afford their
perception of the form of the dataset. Perception is thus
understood as human behaviour and soniculated PMSs as sound
constructions 'imprinted' in multi-dimensional psychophysical
space to elicit a perceptual behaviour which affords the
cognition of the form of that structure as an (auditory) object in
the listener.
While, in his ground-breaking overview, Bregman
described the basic elements and dimensions of analytic and
synthetic listening in terms of auditory stream integration and
segmentation [12], the current PMS model doesn't work very
well and there is yet to be written a generalized exposition
appropriate for many sonification tasks: how to synthesise
perceptual cohesion while maintaining aurally differentiable
soundpoints. It remains a task of soniculation research to
develop robust models of listener's perceptual behaviour that
can be reliably reverse-engineered to produce affordances that
solicit listener's to behave in ways that assist them to get
enough 'grip' on these sound structures for them to be perceived
as cohesive auditory objects. 
Exactly how these perceptual mechanisms work is open to
speculation and investigation. In-keeping with the Cartesian
tradition, there have been two kinds of investigation, which we
label 'mental' and 'empirical'. We review these two approaches
before offering a critical discussion that leads to a proposal for
a different approach.
5.1. The mentalists
According to Kant’s understanding, what exactly is meant by
information is embedded in relationships between the sensation,
perception and apperception of phenomena; what he called
appearances (Erscheinungen): things as they are for humans, as
opposed to things as they are ‘in–or–of–themselves’ (Ding an
sich) otherwise known as noumena. From this perspective,
information can be simply characterized as phenomena, or
thoughts about phenomena in the mind of some person [13]. 
Following Kant and the Idealists, Brentano and his students
Meinong and Husserl investigated the perceptual world as a
rational or mental construction of a perceiving subject. Their
phenomenological method (a contemplative and descriptive
psychology as distinct from the newly developing natural or
empirical psychology) entailed “bracketing off” (with an
attitude Husserl called époché) phenomena ('things-as-we-
know-them’) from the physical world (Kant’s ‘things–as–they–
really–are'), in and attempt to discover the underlying structures
and forms of the objects produced by intentional mental
processes; firstly in the mind of the perceiver and secondly as
sharable with others—a characteristic Husserl called
intersubjectivity. Brentano expressed it like this [14]:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized
by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages
called the intentional (or mental)
inexistence of an object, and what we might
call, though not wholly unambiguously,
reference to a content, direction toward an
object (which is not to be understood here
as meaning a thing), or immanent
objectivity.
Brentano’s goal was to outline the criteria for distinguishing
mental and physical phenomena. He used the terms mental or
intentional inexistence to refer to what today is sometimes
understood as a characteristic of consciousness: the mind's
capacity to refer or be directed to objects that exist solely in the
mind. Meinong’s concern was with the intentional relation
between the mental act and an object. He maintained that such a
relation existed even when the object external to the mental act
towards which it is directed doesn’t exist, such as Pinocchio,
Orpheus, Unicorns and the Fountain of Youth. Earlier, Hume
had considered the concept of non-existent objects
contradictory, Kant and Frege considered it logically ill-formed
though later, Russell adopted the idea [15].
In cases of temporally extended objects ('events') like
melodies, Brentano argued such objects towards which we are
directed do not immediately vanish from consciousness once
the mental act is over. They rather remain present in altered
form, modified from present to past. Every mental phenomenon
triggers an ‘original association’ (proteraesthesis), a kind of
memory which is not a full-fledged act of remembering, but
rather a part of the act that keeps lively what was experienced a
moment ago. When I listen to a melody, for example, I first
hear the first tone. In the next moment I hear the second tone,
but am still directed towards the first one, which is modified,
though, as past. When I hear the third tone, the second tone is
modified as past and the first is pushed back even further into it.
Though Peirce thought that there can be no perceptual
objects without a unifying factor that distinguishes them from
the ‘play of impressions’, Husserl's aim was to develop an
eidetic science; one of essential, invariant phenomenal forms
that involves no assertion of actual material existence.
However, he struggled to keep them conceptually separate from
Plato’s Ideas. 
In the 1960s, following the lead of Descarte, Kant and
Frege, and a misapplication of Shannon's information theory to
meaning [16], Minsky lead a team at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology aimed at modeling intelligent behaviour artificially,
using symbolic representation and the predicate calculus. Their
atomistic approach was abandoned after its failure to represent
the background knowledge and specific forms of human
“information processing” which are based on the human way of
being in the world. This way of “being-in” turned out to be
syntactically and thus computationally unrepresentable using
currently conceivable techniques [17] [18]. 
5.2. The empiricists
In ecological terms, the objects and the environment in which
they reside, afford listener exploration. For Gibson[19],
following Gestaltists such as Wertheimer, Koffka, Kohler and
Mach, these affordances were thought to be in the physical
objects and our observation of them consists of us (somehow)
ICAD-209
The 16th International Conference on Auditory Display (ICAD-2010) June 9-15, 2010, Washington, D.C, USA
forming a representation of them in our heads; the Gestaltist's
task being to empirically search for the means by which the
brain more–or–less unconsciously perceives the forms of
objects received from sense data.
The Gestaltists discovered perceptual invariants such as the
figure–ground phenomena, which they considered as arising
directly from the physical nature of sensations derived from the
noumenal world. However, they were not able to extend the
idea past sensations. It is a characteristic of such phenomenal
forms that their properties can remain unchanged when the
objective stimuli upon which they rest undergo certain
modifications. This phenomenon of identity is part of a much
more general issue in topology and mathematical group theory;
of invariances with respect to transformations of the primitive
elements out of which a form is constructed. The mathematical
concept of transformability corresponds to the concept of
transposability in perception. So by accepting “form” as a
primitive concept, Gestalt psychology made an attempt to free
psychological theory from contingency on the mere mosaic of
perceptions. 
Not all group-theoretic transformations of perceptual
objects are equally cognized, nor are the same transformations
as easily perceivable in different sense modalities. For example,
symmetry group transformations of pitch and temporal
structures, such as transposition, inversion and retrogradation,
occur frequently in music though they seem not to be all
equally evident to the casual listener: under non-extreme pitch
transposition and tempo acceleration a melodic structure
remains strongly invariant; pitch contour inversion and
rhythmic retrogradation are common occurrences in some
musics but are not as strongly invariant, while rhythmic
inversion seems not to be perceptually invariant or even
generally defined.
6. SUB-CORTICAL NEURAL ACTIVITY
Whilst a considerable amount is known about the structure and
functions of individual neurons, the fundamentals of how macro
effects emerge from populations of neurons are still largely
unknown, despite considerable effort over the last decades. As
the field develops, there is a growing realisation that the
phenomena associated with “consciousness”,
“nonconsciousness” and “cognition” are too diverse to continue
to be meaningfully subsumed under the same ill-defined terms
[20]. For example, given the verifiable presence of
nonconscious antecedents to an intention [21], it is unclear how
formed our decisions are when we become aware and think of
ourselves as mentally ‘‘creating’’ them. 
6.1. Neural correlates of consciousness
The search for the neural correlates of consciousness has been
aided by the ease of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) of cortical activity. However, it is suggested by
Churchland and others [22][23] that the ready availability of
such technologies has contributed to a cortical “chauvinism”
that tends to concentrate on conscious perception at the neglect
of the role they have in servicing behaviour. Specifically that, in
service of keeping the body alive, the nervous systems of
animals, as movers, function to service planning, deciding and
executing these plans in movement. Importantly, much of the
brain’s input is consequent upon the dynamical feedback loop
between observed phenomena and an organism’s own
movements, exploratory and otherwise. This loop extracts
vastly more information about the causal properties of the
external world in a given time interval, leading to greater
predictive prowess, that is, skills regarding the causal structure
of the world, than could a purely passive system. 
Time is an essential component of causal knowledge, and
predicting durations, interception intervals, velocities, and
speeds of various body movements is critical to an animal's
survival. Efference copy (being aware that a movement is one's
own and not the world's) is also thought to be critical, as
perhaps is the nonconscious “analysis” and memory of the
movement of other movers, such as in predator–prey/pursue–
evade relationships, for example. In contradistinction to the
conventional wisdom that ‘‘the sensory pathways are purely
sensory”, according to the Guillery and Sherman hypothesis,
messages to the thalamus and cortex also carry information
about ongoing instructions to the organism's motor structures
[24]. Consequently, as a developing organism begins to interact
with the world, sensory signals also “carry” gestural
predictions: as an animal learns the consequences of a particular
movement, it learns about what in the world will probably
happen next, and hence what it might do after that. 
Damasio's studies of efference copying of one's own
thoughts and empathy with others provide even more evidence
for this thesis that perception, learning and memory are not just
cerebral processes but are embodily integrated into an organism
as, what Polanyi called, tacit knowledge [25][22].
6.2. Mirror neurons
Kohler et al.'s finding, not only that that certain neurons in the
ventral premotor area will fire when a monkey performs a
single, highly specific action with its hand: pulling, pushing,
tugging, grasping, picking up and putting a peanut in the mouth
etc., but that that “mirror neurons” will also fire when the
monkey in question observes another monkey (or even the
experimenter) performing the same action, offers some
neurological basis for a theory of cultural inheritance, "mind
reading" empathy, imitation learning, and even the evolution of
language [26]. As Churchland observes, by shifting perspective
from “visuocentricity” to “motor–sensory-centricity,” the
singular importance of temporality takes center stage in an
hypothesis that “time management,” for want of a better term,
is the key to the complexity of tasks of thalamic nuclei, and
very probably also to a range of conscious phenomena [20].
More recent studies have demonstrated that a mirror neuron
system devoted to hand, mouth and foot actions, is also present
in humans. Buccino, Solodkin, and Small review this literature
and that of the experimental evidence on the role of the mirror
neuron system in action understanding, imitation learning of
novel complex actions, and internal rehearsal (motor imagery)
of actions [27]. The finding that actions may also be recognised
from their typical sound, when presented acoustically has
important implications for embodied soniculation research.
Besides visual properties, it was found that about 15% of mirror
neurons, called audio-visual mirror neurons, also respond to the
specific sound of actions performed by other individuals even if
only heard [26]. It has been argued that these neurons code the
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action content, which may be triggered either visually or
acoustically. Phillips-Silver and Trainor demonstrated an early
cross–modal interaction between body movement and auditory
encoding of musical rhythm in infants [28]. They found that it
is primarily the way adults move their bodies to music, not
visual observation, that critically influences their perception of
a rhythmic structure. Their results suggest that while the mere
visual observation of a conspecific’s goal-directed movement
(e.g., reaching for an object or hand–to–mouth action) is
sufficient to elicit a neuronal representation of the action, this
does not transfer to the domain of metrical disambiguation [29].
So it appears that either this type of rhythmical body movement
is not an example of the kind of object-directed action that
activates the mirror neuron system or the information provided
by the mirror neurons is not strong enough to influence the
later-recalled auditory metrical representation of a rhythmic
pattern.
In an experimental study of gestures, subjects of various
ages were able, with a high degree of accuracy, on only hearing
different individual human’s walking and running on various
kinds of surfaces, to determine their sex [30]. A consequential
inference is that differences in ambulatory action, presumably
resulting from relatively small differences in skeletal anatomy,
is tacitly 'available' to listeners. Also consequent to these
findings is the need for better models of multi-modal sensory
input, particularly with respect to the integrative functions of
vestibulation and proprioception, which some empirical
evidence suggests are available to listeners though aural means
alone [31][30].
7. CRITICAL DISCUSSION
While knowledge of the structure and functions of individual
and clusters of neurons is increasing, there are billions of them,
each with tens-of-thousands of connections so there is no
certainty, even when the overall functioning of the neural
system is significantly better understood that it currently is, that
such an understanding will be able to adequately account for
the ability to synthesise perceptual objects. In fact, if the rate at
which pulses are transmitted turns out to be the minimum unit
in an account of the relevant activity of the nervous system [32]
and the diameter of an axon, which might be a function of the
recency of a signal passing down it, plays a crucial role in
processing information by acting as a filter [33], there is no
reason to believe that information processing at neurological-
level can ever be formally described [17].
The mentalist approach has failed to find any means by
which mental representations can be reliably accumulated for
conscious reflection, at least not without a good deal of training
and effort. This somewhat explains some of the difficulties
reported in PMS research that the vast majority of ordinary
listeners, for whom a low conceptual loading is necessary for
continued engagement, are precluded from making 'sense' of
them just as the attempt to use computers to develop an
‘artificial intelligence’ based on computational theories of mind
that rely on a classical reductionist approaches such as “mind is
to software as brain is to hardware” failed to be able to
understand even the simplest stories because of the
unrepresentability of the background knowledge and the
specific forms of human “information processing” which are
based on their way of being in the world. This suggests that,
when compared with the ease with which everyday sounds are
identified; the ease with which a myriad of melodies are
learned, remembered and identified, that the mentalist approach
is inadequate at best. More likely, that it is just wrong.
The relatively recent availability of tools to abstract sound
from its origin in the physical action of objects, and the
development, alongside that of “good-old-fashioned-AI
(GOFAI)[34] of seminal software for computer music [35], has
blurred the functional distinction between sound and music,
much as often occurs between data and information, and
information and meaning. Sound recording enabled Schaeffer,
building on the philosophical foundation of Husserlian (that is
mentalist, époché) phenomenology, to propose a musical
analysis based on reduced listening, that is listening to sounds
for their own sake, as sound objects, by removing their real or
supposed sources and meanings [36]. It is of particular interest
in the light of the previous discussion of the role of time and
causality in perception, that while Schaeffer does discuss tempo
and temporality, he makes almost no reference to pulse and
rhythm.
8. THE PERCEIVING BODY
Husserl's pupil Heidegger was critical of the subject/object split
that pervades the Western tradition and that is in evidence in the
root structure of Husserl and Brentano's concept of
intentionality, that is, that all consciousness is consciousness of
something, and (the idealist notion that) there are no objects
without some consciousness beholding or being involved with
them. Heidegger encompassed terms such as “subject”,
“object”, “consciousness” and “world” into the concept of a
mode of "being-in-the-world" as distinct from an essentially
Positivist “knowing” of objects in the universe that is required
for navigating the environment–measurement, size, weight,
shape, cause & effect etc. His Being-in-the-world is
characterized as “ready-to-hand”[37]: 
. . the kind of dealing which is closest to us,
not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather
that kind of concern which manipulates
things and puts them to use; and this has its
own kind of ‘knowledge.’
In other words, participatory, first-hand experience: familiarity,
tacit know-how, skill, expertise, affordance, adaptability etc.
Heidegger argues that our scientific theorizing of the world is
secondary and derivative and he exposes an ontology that is far
broader than the dualistic Cartesian framework. He stresses the
primacy of the readiness-to-hand, with its own kind of knowing
or relating to the world in terms of what matters to us. It
follows, from Heidegger’s perspective, that human action is
embodied, that human knowing is enactive, and participatory.
The Hungarian scientist and philosopher, Polanyi proposes
a type of participative realism in which personal knowledge
plays a vital and inescapable role in all scientific research,
indeed, in all human knowing [38]: 
Let us therefore do something quite radical
… let us incorporate into our conception of
scientific knowledge the part which we
ourselves necessarily contribute in shaping
such knowledge. 
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By stressing the tacit nature of participatory knowing, Polanyi
claimed that “we know more than we can tell”. In this way he
emphasised knowledge that is implicit to tasks, situations and
attitudes. He used the term tacit knowledge to refer to those
things we can do without being able to explain how, that is, in
the absence of explicit rules or calculative procedures. The
"indwelling" nature of tacit knowledge is important in the
development of the skill of reflexivity, such as needed in the
sifting through and interpretation of qualitative data.
Heavily influenced by both Husserl and Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty produced a much more developed
understanding of the body and its role in non-conceptual
perception [39][40]. As the only major phenomenologist of the
first half of the twentieth century to engage extensively with the
sciences, he was able to systematically demonstrate the inability
of the mentalist and empiricist explanations to adequately
account for observed phenomena. In doing so, he produced a
theory of perception in which the body and the world are
entwined; in which perception occurs through the “intentional
tissue” of the “body schema” (schéma corporel); much as
epigenetic alterations occur in a phenotype by the osmotic
transduction of molecules through semipermeable membranes.
Todes builds on Merleau-Ponty's work by beginning to
work out a detailed phenomenological account of how our
embodied, nonconceptual perceptual and coping skills open a
world to us. He then works out twelve perceptual categories
that correspond to Kant’s conceptual categories, and suggests
how the nonconceptual coping categories can be transformed
into conceptual ones [41]. 
9. SO WHERE IS THE BODY IN SONICULATION?
The reduction of music to noises–in–the–head is supported by
the wider cultural practice of using visual terminology to
describe aural phenomena. Such a privileging of the visual over
the aural too easily promotes the unwarranted prejudicial
masking of one dimension over another. The implication of the
privileging of visual experience, especially when it is conceived
principally to be by stationary beings of stationary objects that
are observed1 and only then perhaps with movement, is to,
albeit subtly, privilege the spatial over the temporal; sound
'objects' over gestural dynamics. Applied to soniculation, such
an epistemology weakens the strongest ontological scaffolding
that supports temporal perception as primary means by which
information can be transduced through sound to the perceiving
body.
A new movement-encompassing action-based approach to
the relationship between sound and sensibility began in the
1980s [42]. Methodologies include the use of abductive as well
as inductive inference, and are contributing to new perspectives
on how to approach the relationship between sensibilities [31]
[43]. In some ways this can be seen as a return to the
Aristotelian integration of sound and sensibility through
mimesis and related to the Kantian problems of openness and
endness in the containment of beauty in formal structures and
the empathic relationship within them through movement and
action [13].
1
From L. ob-"over"+ servare "to watch, keep safe" and ob-"against"+
jacere "to throw,” as in a jet [49]. 
It seems reasonable to suggest that continuing to flip-flop
between the mental-empirical antinomy, in anticipation that one
or the other will eventually provide an applicable model for
PMS, may be a forlorn hope. There seems little point in
speculating whether or not listening will ever regain the relative
importance to humans it enjoyed prior to the European
Enlightenment, but there are signs of a growing recognition that
the resolution of the mind/body dilemma will not be solved by
dispensing with the body. 
In many ways, the tradition of emphasising disembodied
cognition over alternative approaches has never really been
totally applicable to musical sensibility. Clearly humans have
the capacity to create, transmit, receive, transform and most
importantly recall certain types of immanent objects using
sound: music can afford them all! The idea that musical
involvement is based on the embodiment of movement and the
bodily sensing of music, has a long history, of which the
traditional connection between dance and music is but a gross
example. Truslit studied the body movements of musical
performers and suggested they were articulations of inner
movements in the music itself [44]. Central in Truslit’s
approach to musical movement are the notions of dynamics
(intensity) and agogics (duration). If the music has the dynamo-
agogic development corresponding to a natural movement, it
will evoke the impression of this movement. He makes a
distinction between rhythmic movement and the inner
movement of the music. In contrast to rhythmic movement,
which is related to individual parts of the body, the inner
movement forms the melody via the vestibular labyrinth of the
inner ear and is related to the human body as a whole. Both
Nettheim [45] and Clynes [46] also make a connection between
music and gravitational movement, based on the idea of a
dynamic rhythmic flow beyond the musical surface.
Empirical musicology, including the mensural study of
performance practices, together with neurophysical analysis of
'embodied' instrumental performance, is becoming recognised
as at least as important for understanding musical ideas as
notated structural abstractions [47][48]. There is growing
interest in human/machine interfaces that enable musicians to
produce computer-generated sounds under nuanced gestural
control [49][50][51]. 
Both empirical musicology and gesturally-controlled
computer-music performance are of relevance to this
investigation. However the former, is deficient in being largely
analytical and the latter, in being little interested in empirical
evaluation. Between the two, it may be possible for future
soniculation researchers to recognise the limitations of the
current PMS paradigm, to accept that musical information can
be intelligible, that is capable of being soundly understood2,
through temporally-encoded “second-order” structures and
undertake research to ascertain the viability of a variety of
embodiment models under controlled conditions. The beginning
described in the next section is but one example of an
empirically approach which may or may not prove fruitful.
2
O.E. understandan "comprehend, grasp the idea of," probably lit.
"stand in the midst of," from under + standan "to stand". O.E. under,
from *nter- "between, among" (cf. Skt. antar "among, between," L.
inter "between, among," Gk. entera "intestines"[52].
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10. TOWARDS A GESTURE-ENCODED SOUND
MODEL
A programme of research has begun that seeks to empirically
demonstrate whether or not the perceptual access to the
structural and informational content of multivariate datasets
through sonification based on a model that incorporates the aural
transduction of known temporal embodiment affordances such
as human gestures, is superior to one based on elementally
composed aural objects that are observed and rationally
conceptualised. Philosophically, the is an approach based on an
embodied phenomenology of perception first enunciated by
Merleau-Ponty [39] and extended by Todes [41].
An extensive search of the literature has not revealed
any other approach that addresses the issue of how to use the
innate structures of the human body, expressed through gesture
and transmitted aurally, to improve the "eyes-free, hands-free"
tacit grasping of ideas and information contained in the
increasingly large and complex datasets that are becoming a part
of our daily lives—from climate and the weather to fluctuations
in the financial markets and traffic flow. The research we are
currently undertaking is to develop a model of (human) physical
and sonic gesture correlates. The task is essentially to apply
captured biomechanical data with sound-derived components
(timing, spectral morphology etc) and known psychophysical
principles as inputs to an iteratively trained Dynamic Bayesian
Network (DBN). This Gesture-Encoded Sound Model will
then be used to produce an active filter for transducing
multivariate datasets to sound synthesis and control parameters.
The approach renders a datastream to sound not only using
observable quantities (inverse transforms of known
psychoacoustic principles), but latent variables of a DBN trained
with gestures of the physical body movements of performing
musicians and hypotheses concerning other observable
quantities of their coincident acoustic spectra. The research on
the model will be integrated as an extension to SoniPy [53].
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